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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I* Whether the Public Service Commission failed to comply 
with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 
63-46a-l, et seq. thereby invalidating Commission Rule No. 8304 
which purports to eliminate the Commission jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services.] 
II. Whether the Public Service Commission erred in dismissing 
American Paging's Application for a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity to operate a one-way telephone paging service on the basis 
that the Commission no longer has jurisdiction to regulate paging 
services. 
III. Whether the Public Utilities Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 
54-8b-l, et seq. (Supp. 1985), impacts the Public Service 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services. 
IV. Whether Commission Rule No. 8304 affects the due process 
rights of former one-way paging certificate holders. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is presented on appeal from this Court's reversal 
of an order by the Utah Public Service Commission (Commission) 
disclaiming jurisdiction over one-way paging services. In Williams 
v. the Public Service Commission 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986) this Court 
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held that the Public Service Commission's (the Commission) 
determination that it had no jurisdiction over one-way paging 
services constituted rulemaking and as such was subject to the 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. Pursuant to 
the Court's instruction in Williams, the Commission filed notice of 
proposed rulemaking with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 
15, 1986, Copies of the rule were provided timely to Appellant and 
the other parties, but none of them requested a hearing within the 
fifteen-day period following publication of the proposed rule as 
provided by the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, Utah Code, 
Section 63-46a-5. The rule was formally adopted, therefore, and made 
effective May 16, 1986. 
On May 23, 1986 the Commission issued an order granting a 
motion by American Paging to dismiss its application for a 
certificate of convenience and necessity on the ground that the 
Commission had no jurisdiction over one-way paging services as a 
result of its rulemaking. The Commisson further concluded therein 
that the provisions of Chapter 8b of the Public Telecommunication 
Utility Law did not expand the jurisdiction of the Commission to 
include one-way paging service. 
Appellant, David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications, 
filed the instant appeal with this Court seeking to have the 
Commission Rule 8304 vacated and the Commission's Order in Case No, 
85-2007-01 reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
COMMISSION RULE 8304 WAS PROMULGATED 
IN ACCORD WITH THE PROCEDURES OF 
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING ACT 
AND IS VALID AND EFFECTIVE 
In explicit compliance with this Court's remand in Williams, 
the Commission filed a proposed rule on one-way paging with the 
Office of Administrative Rules* The rule stated that the Commission 
did not have jurisdiction over one-way paging service and the 
reasons for it. The reasons cited were summary since the Commission 
had already on file an extensive order generated by the exhaustive 
hearings which the Commission had already held on the subject of 
one-way paging prior to the first appeal by Appellant. 
On March 18, 1986 Commission Chairman Cameron personally 
tendered to each of the parties in the one-way paging hearings, 
including Appellant, a copy of the proposed rule. Only one holder of 
an active certificate for one-way paging did not receive written 
notice, Royce*s Electronics Inc. Royce, however, had actual notice 
of the proceedings but determined not to participate because the 
one-way paging portion of his business was so miniscule. He assumed 
that whatever minimal interest he might have would be represented by 
the parties already active in the case. (See Royce Affidavit 
appended hereto.) 
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Appellant freely admits that written notice was placed in his 
hands by the Commission Chairman himself, but takes the incredible 
position that the notice was inadequate because it wasn't mailed to 
him and because it was handed to him personally in a collateral 
proceeding. Appellant's position is clearly untenable given the fact 
that personal notice is superior to mailed notice. 
Additionally, Appellant asserts that the form of the notice 
did not contain the information required by the Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. The assertion is incorrect; each and every one of 
the required items is plainly and clearly set forth in the notice. 
The written notice, which was served personally upon 
Appellant and the other parties, was timely filed in the Office of 
Administrative Rules and published in the Utah State Bulletin on 
April 15, 1986. 
Since Appellant was given notice of the proposed rule on 
March 18, 1986 he had almost two months to prepare written 
objections and almost one and a half months to request a hearing. 
However, only at the suggestion of Commission counsel that something 
ought to be filed to preserve Appellant's appeal right did Appellant 
finally file a short document at 4:47 P.M. of May 15, 1986, the last 
day for receiving written comments and two weeks past the deadline 
-o-
for requesting a hearing (see Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, 
Utah Code, Section 63-46a-5(1)(ii) which provides that an agency-
shall hold a hearing on a proposed rule if the agency receives the 
request in writing not more than 15 days after the publication date 
of the proposed rule). The comments filed consist of three 
conclusory statements and shed no additional illumination upon the 
issue of the Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging. The 
Commission, therefore, formally adopted the rule and is now in full 
compliance with the requirements of the Court's opinion. 
II. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY 
THIS COURT'S MANDATE IN THE WILLIAM'S CASE IN CONSTRUING 
ITS JURISDITION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES 
AND HAS NOT ARBITRARILY ENACTED BY ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT 
A CHANGE IN THE LAW 
In Williams this Court stated that the Commission could not 
find that it had no jurisdiction over one-way paging services 
without following the requirements and procedures set forth in the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act. The Court, however, did not 
decide the jurisdictional issue and specifically remanded that task 
to the Commission. The Commission has now complied with the Court's 
instruction to determine the scope of its jurisdiction over one-way 
paging service by rulemaking. 
Appellant's argument, therefore, that the Commission was 
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attempting to change the law by administrative fiat is without 
justification. 
Appellant's analysis of Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission 
556 P.2d 1268 is incorrect. The Husky case involved a policy change 
by the Utah State Tax Commission and not a jurisdictional 
determination. First the Tax Commission promulgated a regulation 
which exempted certain business transactions from sales tax and then 
later by regulation reversed its position and eliminated the 
exemption. In the instant case, the Public Service Commission has 
made no policy determination; rather it has construed its authority 
over one-way paging services. The Commission first issued 
certificates of convenience and necessity to two telecommunication 
companies to operate both one-way and two-way paging services 
without questioning its jurisdiction. Later, when the issue of its 
jurisdiction was raised for the first time, the Commission concluded 
that it had no statutory authority to regulate one-way paging 
services. The Commission cannot acquire such authority merely by 
passage of time or by unauthorized issuance of certificates. 
Appellant further asserts that the principle of equitable 
estoppel may be applied against the Commission such that even though 
its regulation of one-way paging over the years was without 
authority, it must now continue to regulate as if it had authority 
because to do otherwise would deprive Appellant of its regulated 
status and require it to compete against all comers for business. 
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Appellant relies heavily upon Celebrity Club, Inc. V. Utah 
Liquor Control Commission 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). However, 
Appellant's reading of this case is again incorrect. The Celebrity 
case did not involve any jurisdictional question. The Liquor 
Commission made a decision to issue a license, which was entirely 
within its jurisdiction and upon which the Celebrity Club relied in 
expending a sizeable sum of money. However, the Liquor Commission 
later recanted its decision, thereby preventing the Celebrity Club 
from operating and imposing upon it large and unrecoverable loss. 
The Liquor Commission's decision and recant thereof was a policy 
determination within its jurisdiction. In that case the Court 
properly applied the doctrine of estoppel to prevent an injustice. 
It did not thereby confer upon the Liquor Commission a jurisdiction 
not provided by the Legislature. 
The instant case is entirely different. Here the Public 
Service Commission issued certificates to the Appellant without 
having jurisdiction to do so and, therefore, subsequently rescinded 
the certificates. If the Court holds that the Commission is 
equitably estopped, it thereby confers jurisdiction upon the 
Commission which it does not have. 
Furthermore, the Commission's action did not put Appellant 
out of business. To the contrary, the Commission's action freed 
Appellant to act without regulatory restraint or the requirement of 
regulatory fee payment. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the Court in Celebrity 
stated that the principle of equitable estoppel may be applied 
against the State "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice and 
the excercise of governmental powers will not be impaired as a 
result. 602 P.2d at 694. The requirement that the excercise of 
government powers not be impaired is explicit. In the instant case, 
precluding the Commission from excercising its legitimate 
administrative authority to determine the scope of its jurisdiction 
would clearly impair the excercise of its governmental powers. 
Appellant's argument that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies 
does not meet the test as set forth in Celebrity and therefore 
should be dismissed. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT FAIL TO SATISFY STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXEMPTING ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICE 
FROM REGULATION UNDER PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITY LAW 
The Public Telecommunications Utility Law, Section 54-8b-l, 
et. seq., Utah Code, was enacted in 1985 to clarify the Commission's 
authority to regulate public telecommunications services and 
provides a specific procedure for exempting telecommunication 
services from regulation. 
The Commission concluded, after receiving briefs and comments 
from all parties including Appellant, that the Public 
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Telecoramunications Utility Law did not expand the Commission's 
jurisdiction to cover one-way paging services. The purpose of the 
Act is to provide a method for exempting any telecommunication 
service from regulation over which the Commission had jurisdiction 
under prior existing law. Section 54-8b-9 specifically and clearly 
states that ''Nothing in the chapter shall be construed to enlarge or 
reduce the Commission's jurisdiction over the services and entities 
for which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by other provisions 
of this title." 
The Commission further concluded that the broad 
interpretation of the Act, for which Appellant argues, would result 
in a contradictory reading of the statute taken as a whole and would 
result in unintended regulation of previously unregulated 
transmissions such as one-way radio, cable and television 
broadcasts. The Commission's interpretation of the Act should be 
accorded deference and upheld. 
IV. 
COMMISSION RULE 8304 DOES NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT 
AND OTHER CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THEIR PROPERTY 
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF 
THEIR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
By disclaiming jurisdiction over one-way paging services, the 
Commission has freed Appellant from all regulatory restraints and 
restrictions including the payment of regulatory fees. Appellant may 
use its business assets in any way it sees fit. The one-way paging 
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market is similar in pertinent respects to the transportation market 
and as such could have been characterized prior to the Commission's 
jurisdictional ruling as regulated competition. One-way paging is 
not a necessity of life, merely a convenience, and entry into the 
market does not require a relatively heavy investment of capital. 
In its decision in Big K Corporation v. the Public Service 
Commission, 689 P.2d 1349, (Utah 1984) this Court reversed a 
long-applied standard for determining entry into the transportation 
market and, thereby, effectively opened the door to that market. 
Arguably the impact on existing carriers was to reduce the value of 
their certificates of convenience and necessity. Under the 
circumstances the Court did not view its decision as being a due 
process problem and neither should it be considered such here. In 
addition the Commission notes that in the first appeal of this 
matter by Appellant, the Court remanded the case back to the 
Commission for rulemaking without any suggestion that the eventual 
renunciation of jurisdiction through rulemaking would constitute a 
taking of Appellant's property without just compensation. If the 
Court were to so rule, this Commission would be obliged to leave 
certificates undisturbed regardless of circumstances, a clear 
frustration of the Legislature's intent and mandate. 
In summary, the Commission believes that it has comported 
fully with this Court's instruction to proceed through rulemaking to 
effectuate its determination that it has no jurisdiction over 
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one-way paging services* In so doing it has in no way trampled upon 
Appellant's property rights and its rule should be accorded full 
recognition and validity. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission's Rule No. 
8304 should be upheld. Similarly, the Commission's Order issued in 
Case No. 85-2007-01 should upheld. . 
Respectfully submitted this &\JSr day ol\ of October 1986 
Laurie L. Noda 
160 E. 300 South 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS d/b/a 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
Appellant, 
vs . 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, BRENT H. CAMERON, 
Chairman, JAMES M. BYRNE, 
Commissioner, BRIAN T. 
STEWART, Commissioner, and 
AMERICAN PAGING, INC., 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ROYCE HENNINGSON 
CASE NOS. 860313 
860314 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Royce Henningson, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
hereby declares as follows: 
1. That he is the president and chief executive officer 
of Royce's Electronics, Inc. 
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2. That Royce's Electronics, Inc. has held a certificate 
of convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission 
of Utah to render one-way paging services in the State of Utah. 
3» That the one-way paging portion of the business of 
Royce's Electronics, Inc. is minor and constitutes but a small 
fraction of said business. 
4. That he has been aware of the proceedings before the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, the appeal and remand and 
the proceedings now before the Utah Supreme Court concerning 
one-way paging but that he did not receive formal written 
notice thereof. 
5. That even had he received written formal notice of 
such proceedings, he would not have participated because of the 
relative insignificance in his business of one-way paging, the 
costs involved and because he believed that those actively 
participating in the case adequately represented whatever 
interest he had in the matter. 
DATED this A* day of October, 1986 
t^l^-i^^^^>^/ 
E HENNTNGSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me date above written. 
My Commission Expires 2-2^90 
NOTA) 
Commissi (Mi expi 
I reside at: _ n 
